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 Introduction
The operations research literature oers numerous algorithms and heuristics for network
optimization problems In game theoretic approaches to network optimization problems
dierent agents control the elements of the network Next to nding optimal solutions
this adds the problem of dividing the costs or benets generated by such solutions over
the involved agents Curiel 
 provides an overview of several classes of games arising
from problems in operations research
Only recently Fragnelli GarcaJurado and MendezNaya 
 have initiated a
game theoretic approach to shortest path problems They study a class of cooperative
shortest path games in which the transportation of a good from a source to a sink of
a network generates an externally given income The nodes in the network are owned
by the players The value of a coalition is dened by the net income this coalition can
realize by transporting the good through the network via a shortest path using only nodes
that are owned by the players in the coalition or zero if the net income happens to be
negative The corresponding class of cooperative games is shown to coincide with the
class of monotonic games Therefore shortest path games need not have core elements
For a shortest path game to be balanced two rather strong restrictions have to be fullled
a certain reduced game needs to be balanced and certain veto players have to take
important positions in the game Their paper ends with an axiomatization of the Shapley
value of shortest path games
As opposed to the model of Fragnelli et al 
 where the income or reward for
transporting a good from source to sink is not associated with a specic player the present
paper introduces a class of cooperative games arising from shortest path problems where
there is a reward possibly equal to zero for each player if he transports his goods from
source to sink The denition of the cooperative shortest path games is given in Section 	
In Section  it is shown that these shortest path games are totally balanced Possible
methods for obtaining core elements are indicated by relating to the allocation rules in
taxation cf Young 
 
 and bankruptcy problems cf Aumann and Maschler

 Every ecient allocation in which each player contributes a nonnegative amount
not exceeding his reward to the costs of the shortest path yields a core element of the
shortest path game Sprumont 
 introduces the notion of a populationmonotonic
allocation scheme PMAS for a cooperative game N v A PMAS species for each
coalition S  N of players an allocation of the value vS over its members Moreover it
reects the intuition that there is strength in numbers for each i  N and each pair of
coalitions S T with i  S  T  N  the share of vT  allocated to i is at least as large as
the share of vS allocated to i It is shown in Section  that each shortest path game has
a PMAS In Section  an allocation rule is constructed that takes opportunity costs into
account by considering the costs of the second best alternative and that rewards players
who are crucial to the construction of the shortest path Finally Section  introduces
noncooperative games arising from shortest path problems In such a strategic game
players make bids or claims on certain paths It is shown that the core allocations of
the cooperative shortest path game exactly coincide with the payo vectors in the strong
	
Nash equilibria of the associated noncooperative shortest path game
Notation For a nite set N  	
N
 fS j S  Ng denotes the collection of all subsets
of N  For x
i

iN
 where x
i
 IR for each i  N  and for a subset S  N  we denote
xS 
P
iS
x
i
 IR denotes the set of reals IR

  the set of nonnegative reals For
a b  IR we dene a  b  minfa bg The end of proofs is indicates with the symbol 
the end of denitions examples and remarks with the symbol 
 Shortest path games
In this section shortest path problems and their associated cooperative games are dened
In the shortest path problems considered in this paper there is a nite set of players Each
player owns arcs or connections in a nite network There are costs associated to the use
of each arc Each player receives a nonnegative reward if he manages to transport a good
from the source of the network to its sink
Denition  A shortest path problem is a tuple hNV A
i

iN
 w r
i

iN
i where
 N is a nite set of players
 V is a nite set of vertices with two special elements the source So and the sink
Si
 each player i  N owns a set A
i
 V  V of directed arcs in the network
 the function w  
iN
fig A
i
 IR

assigns a weight or length or cost to all the
arcs owned by the players The weight assigned to arc a b owned by player i  N
is wi a b  IR


 each player i  N receives a reward r
i
 IR

for transporting his goods from the
source to the sink

Notice that more than one player can own an arc between two vertices and that the
costs of an arc can depend on its owner Several denitions and results in this paper are
illustrated with the following simple example
Example  The shortest path problem with player set N  f
 	 g vertex set
V  fSo Si vg the players respectively owning arc sets A

 fSo v So Sig A


fv Sig A

 fSo Sig and weights w
 So v  w	 v Si  
 w
 So Si 
 w So Si   is depicted in Figure 
 where it is assumed that arcs are directed
from left to right The numbers 	 
 next to the arc v Si for instance indicate that
this arc is owned by player 	 and that the costs of this arc owned by player 	 equal 

Take the rewards equal to r

 r

 r

  

So Si
v





 	

Figure 
 A shortest path problem
Let S  	
N
nf	g be a coalition of players A path owned by the players in S is a sequence
v

 i

 v

 i

     i
m
 v
m
 of vertices v
k
and players i
k
such that v

 So v
m
 Si and
for each k  f
    m
 
g the arc v
k
 v
k
 is owned by player i
k
 S Let P S denote
the collection of all paths owned by coalition S
The costs associated to a path p  v

 i

 v

 i

     i
m
 v
m
  P S are dened as
the sum of the costs of its arcs
costp 
m
X
k
wi
k
 v
k
 v
k

Obviously if a coalition S has to go from source to sink it will choose among its alterna
tives in P S the path with minimal costs Dene for each S  	
N
n f	g
cS 

min
pP S
costp if P S  	
 otherwise
Shortest paths in directed networks can be determined for instance by the algorithm of
Dijkstra 

From now on when we refer to a shortest path without explicitly stating a coalition
owning it we mean a shortest path owned by the grand coalition N 
Recall that a cooperative game with transferable utility is a tuple N v where N is
a nite set of players and v  	
N
n f	g  IR is a function that assigns to each coalition
S  	
N
n f	g its value vS  IR
The cooperative game associated with a shortest path problem reects the following
intuition if a coalition S  	
N
n f	g transports its goods from source to sink it will
receive a total reward rS 
P
iS
r
i
and incur costs cS the costs of the cheapest
alternative S has to go from source to sink If rS 
 cS   coalition S makes a
prot If rS 
 cS   coalition S can generate prot zero by simply doing nothing
Therefore coalition S can make a prot maxfrS
 cS g

Denition  Let hNV A
i

iN
 w r
i

iN
i be a shortest path problem The associated
shortest path game N v is dened as follows
S  	
N
n f	g  vS  maxfrS
 cS g

Let S T  	
N
n f	g S  T  Then rS  rT  and cS  cT  so vS  vT  the
shortest path game N v is monotonic
To avoid trivialities assume that
  cN  rN 

This assumption implies that
 there is a player i  N with a strictly positive reward r
i

 the value vN of the grand coalition is positive
 the shortest path has positive length cN  
This avoids the zero game and makes sure that there are indeed costs to divide over the
players
Example  In the shortest path problem of Example 		 coalition f	g is the only coali
tion not owning a path cf	g  The cooperative game associated with the shortest
path problem is given by vf
g  maxfr


 cf
g g  maxf 
  g   vf	g 
maxfr


 cf	g g  maxf 
  g   vfg  	 vf
 	g  
 vf
 g 

 vf	 g  
 vN  		 
Recall that the core of a game N v is the set
CN v  fx  IR
N
j xN  vN and xS  vS for each S  	
N
n f	gg
In the next section the core of shortest path games is shown to be nonempty
 Core allocations of shortest path games
Fragnelli et al 
 indicate that in a class of shortest path games where there is a
single reward provided by someone outside the player set the core may be empty The
purpose of the present section is to indicate that every shortest path game as formulated
in Denition 	 is totally balanced and has a populationmonotonic allocation scheme
Every ecient allocation in which each player contributes a nonnegative amount not
exceeding his reward to the costs of the shortest path yields a core element

Proposition  Let hNV A
i

iN
 w r
i

iN
i be a shortest path problem and N v the
associated shortest path game Take
B  fx  IR
N
j xN  vN and x
i
  r
i
 for each i  Ng
Then B  CN v
Proof Let x  B Then xN  vN by denition so it remains to show that
xS  vS for each S  	
N
n f	g Let S  	
N
n f	g If vS   then xS    vS
since x
i
  for each player i  N  So assume that vS  rS 
 cS  
Dene for each i  N the number 
i

r
i
x
i
cN
to be the share of the costs cN of the
shortest path paid by player i  N  By assumption 
 
i
is welldened By denition
of B 
i
 
r
i
cN
 and
P
iN

i
 
 Moreover x
i
 r
i

 
i
cN Consequently
xS 
X
iS
r
i

 
i
cN
 rS


X
iS

i

cN
 rS
 
  cS
 vS
The weak inequality follows from
P
iS

i
 
 and cN  cS This proves that
x  CN v 
To prove that a shortest path game is balanced it suces to show that the set B in
Proposition 
 is nonempty This follows from assumption 
 Assume for instance
that each player contributes a share of the costs that is proportional to his reward
i  N  x
i
 r
i


r
i
rN
cN
Then clearly xN  rN
 cN  vN and assumption 
 implies that
x
i
 r
i


 

cN
rN

  r
i

Hence this proportional allocation of the costs yields a core allocation For each coalition
S  	
N
nf	g the subgame S v of the shortest path game N v is again a shortest path
game and therefore balanced Consequently every shortest path game is totally balanced
Sprumont 
 introduces the notion of a populationmonotonic allocation scheme
PMAS for a cooperative game N v A PMAS species for each coalition S  N of
players an allocation of vS over its members Moreover it reects the intuition that
there is strength in numbers the share allocated to each player i  N is nondecreasing

in the size of the coalitions of which he is a member Formally a PMAS for the game
N v is a vector x
Si

SNiS
of real numbers such that
S  N 
X
iS
x
Si
 vS
and
S T  N i  S  if S  T then x
Si
 x
Ti

Not all cooperative games have a PMAS A necessary but not sucient condition is that
the game N v is totally balanced see Sprumont 
 p Dene x
Si
in such a
way that player i pays a proportional share of cS or zero if vS  
S  	
N
n f	gi  S  x
Si


r
i


r
i
rS
cS if vS  
 if vS  
	
Clearly
P
iS
x
Si
 vS for each S  	
N
n f	g Moreover let S T  	
N
n f	g i  N  and
assume that i  S  T  If vS   then x
Si
   x
Ti
 So assume vS   Then
vS  rS 
 cS and by monotonicity also vT   rT  
 cT    Let i  S The
inequalities rS  rT  cS  cT    and r
i
  imply that
x
Si
 r
i


 

cS
rS

 r
i


 

cT 
rT 

 x
Ti

Hence x
Si

SNiS
with x
Si
dened as in 	 denes a PMAS for the shortest path game
N v These conclusions are summarized in the following proposition
Proposition  Let hNV A
i

iN
 w r
i

iN
i be a shortest path problem and N v the
associated shortest path game Then N v is totally balanced and has a population
monotonic allocation scheme
The result that the collection
B  fx  IR
N
j xN  vN and x
i
  r
i
 for each i  Ng
yields a nonempty subset of the core is very appealing from a computational point of
view To compute core elements it is not necessary to compute the value vS of each
coalition S  	
N
n f	g It suces to determine vN  rN 
 cN ie one only needs
to compute the costs of a single shortest path instead of computing a shortest path for
every coalition
Finding elements of the set B comes down to dividing the costs cN of a shortest path
over the involved players Each player i  N can take a share between zero and his reward
r
i
 This is exactly a taxation problem or  under a slightly dierent interpretation 
a bankruptcy problem where the amount to be paid equals cN and each player i  N
has a taxable income r
i
 The numerous allocation rules that have been proposed in the
literature on taxation problems cf Young 
 
 and bankruptcy problems cf
Aumann and Maschler 
 therefore yield core elements of the shortest path game

 A rule favoring sveto players
In the previous section nonemptiness of the core of shortest path games was established by
indicating that every ecient allocation in which all players receive a nonnegative amount
not exceeding their reward yields a core element There may be players however who
are of such importance to the generation of a shortest path that they can claim in the
core a payo that is higher than their reward In this section we show that these players
are exactly the players owning an arc of every shortest path Fragnelli et al 
 refer
to these players as shortest veto players or sveto players In their paper sveto players
must exist to guarantee nonemptiness of the core
We formulate an allocation rule that indeed favors such sveto players and still yields
a core allocation
Denition  Let hNV A
i

iN
 w r
i

iN
i be a shortest path problem and N v the
associated shortest path game A player i  N is a shortest veto player or sveto player if
player i owns at least one arc on every shortest path The possibly empty set of sveto
players is denoted by T  N  
In the core of a shortest path game only sveto players can receive a payo strictly
exceeding their reward
Proposition  Let hNV A
i

iN
 w r
i

iN
i be a shortest path problem and N v the
associated shortest path game Let x  CN v and i  N  If x
i
 r
i
 then i  T 
Proof Suppose that i  T  Then there exists a shortest path not using any of is arcs
cN  cN n fig Therefore the following holds
xN  vN
 rN 
 cN
 r
i
 rN n fig
 cN n fig
 r
i
 vN n fig
 x
i
 vN n fig
This implies that xN n fig  vN n fig contradicting x  CN v Thus i has to be
an sveto player 
Without sveto players the shortest path cannot be realized The rule we propose is
based on a consideration of opportunity costs ie the costs of the next to shortest path
The sveto players are rewarded for their powerful position in the network whereas the
remaining players are required to make a large contribution to the costs
This idea is clearly not applicable if either the set of sveto players or its complement
is empty or if there is no next to shortest path ie all paths from source to sink have

the same length In those cases the costs cN of the shortest path are simply divided
proportional to the rewards of the players
i  N  x
i
 r
i


r
i
rN
cN 
Assume now that there are both sveto players T  	 and nonsveto players N nT  	
and that not all paths have the same length For notational convenience let c

denote
the costs cN of the shortest path ie of the rstbest alternative and let c

denote the
costs of the next to shortest path Formally if P denotes the set of all paths
c

 min
pP costpc

costp
By denition
c

 c

 
The nonsveto players in N n T pay a share of the costs of the secondbest path propor
tional to their reward or their entire reward if their funds are insucient to cover the
costs c


i  N n T  x
i
 r
i


r
i
rN n T 
c

 rN n T  
This indicates that the players that do not own arcs on every shortest path are burdened
to a high extent together they contribute an amount equal to c

 rN n T  There are
two possibilities First of all it is possible that this amount suces to pay for the shortest
path c

rN nT   c

 In that case there is an excess contribution of c

rN nT 
c


This excess is split over the sveto players in proportion to their rewards Secondly it is
possible that the amount contributed by the nonsveto players does not exceed the costs
of the shortest path c

rN nT   c

 In that case the remaining costs c


c

rN nT 
are contributed by the sveto players in proportion to their rewards These two cases give
rise to the following payo to sveto players
i  T  x
i
 r
i

r
i
rT 
c

 rN n T 
 c

  
Example  In the shortest path game of Examples 		 and 	 the unique shortest
path goes via the vertex v and is owned by players 
 and 	 These are the sveto players
T  f
 	g N n T  fg The shortest path has costs c

 	 whereas the secondbest
alternative has costs c

  According to  player  is charged to pay the costs c


which is possible since his reward equals  x

 
    The nonsveto player  has
already contributed an amount of  to cover the costs c

 The costs of the shortest path
are only c

 	 The excess of  
 	  
 is split over the sveto players in proportion to
their rewards x

 x

  


 
  


 Notice that this allocation x  


 


  is a
core allocation 
Theorem  The allocation rule dened by  and   or by  in case the set of
sveto players or its complement is empty or if all paths have the same length  yields
a core element

Proof If the allocation rule is dened by proportional sharing  this yields a core
allocation as was shown in Section  It remains to consider the case in which the rule is
determined by expressions  and  Notice
a	 xN  rN
 c

 rN 
 cN  vN so the allocation is ecient
b	 i  N n T  x
i
 r
i




c

rNnT 
rNnT 

 
c	 i  T 
 if c

 rN n T 
 c

  then x
i
 r
i


 
c

rNnT c

rT 

 
 if c

 rN n T  
 c

  then c

 rN n T   rN n T  by  so x
i

r
i


 
rNnT c

rT 

  since rN 
 cN  rN 
 c

  implies that 
 
rNnT c

rT 
 
Let S  	
N
n f	g To show xS  vS By b and c above this is true if vS  
so assume vS  rS
 cS   Discern three cases
Case  rN n T   c


Then  implies c

rN nT   rN nT   c

 So by   and b and c above
x
i
  r
i
 for each player i  N  Together with xN  vN and Proposition 

it follows that x  CN v
Case  rN n T   c

and cS  c


Since cS  c

 it follows that S  T  T  Hence
xS  rS  N n T 

rS  N n T 
rN n T 
c

 rN n T 
 rS  T  
rS  T 
rT 
c

 rN n T 
 c


 rS

rS  N n T 
rN n T 
c

 rN n T   c

 rN n T 
 c

 rS 




rS  N n T 
rN n T 

c

 rN n T 
 c

 rS
 c

 rS
 cS
 vS
Case  rN n T   c

and cS  c




Since cS  c

and c

are the costs of the secondbest alternative it follows that
cS  c

 Moreover c

 rN n T 
 c

  Hence
xS  rS  N n T 

rS  N n T 
rN n T 
c

 rN n T 
 rS  T  
rS  T 
rT 
c

 rN n T 
 c


 rS

rS  N n T 
rN n T 
c

 rN n T  
rS  T 
rT 
c

 rN n T 
 c


 rS

rS  N n T 
rN n T 
c

 rN n T 
 rS
 
  cS
 vS
This nishes the proof 
Since the players in N nT are charged to pay the opportunity costs or to contribute their
entire reward if they have insucient funds to pay the opportunity costs one might ask
what happens if the opportunity costs are dened to be cN n T  the costs of a shortest
path owned by coalition N n T  instead of c

 This however does not necessarily yield a
core allocation
Example 
 Suppose that c

in  and  is replaced by cN n T  In the shortest
path game of Example 		 and 	 cN n T   cfg   If player  is charged to pay
these costs and the excess 
 c

 
 	   is split over the sveto players in proportion
to their rewards one obtains the allocation y  
 
 	 which is not a core allocation
since y

 y

 
	  vf
 g  
 
 Noncooperative support for the core
In this nal section we introduce a noncooperative game associated with a shortest path
problem hNV A
i

iN
 w r
i

iN
i and prove that the core allocations of the cooperative
shortest path game coincide with payos to strong Nash equilibria in the noncooperative
game
The strategic game hN X
i

iN
 u
i

iN
i is dened as follows The player set is N  the
set of players involved in the shortest path problem A strategy of player i  N is a pair
s
i
 p
i
m
i
 consisting of
 a path p
i
from source to sink
 an amount of money m
i
 IR indicating how much player i is willing to contribute
to the costs of his chosen path p
i
 In principle m
i
  but if player i owns arcs on



the path p
i
 he is also allowed to make claims rather than contributions ie then
he can also contribute m
i
 
The set of strategies of player i  N is denoted by X
i
 Write X 
Q
iN
X
i
and s 
p
i
m
i

iN
 X Given a strategy prole s  p
i
m
i

iN
 X a path p is feasible if every
arc on this path is owned by a player from the set fi  N j p
i
 pg choosing this path
and if the net contribution generated by these players suces to pay the costs of the path
p
X
iN p
i
p
m
i
 costp
Let F s denote the collection of feasible paths given s  X and dene   X  f 
g
by taking for each s  X
s 


 if F s  	
 otherwise
The payos are such that a player receives his reward if there is a feasible path see
also Remark 	 at the end of this section Contributions are always accepted whereas
a claim negative contribution of player i  N is granted only if the path he chose is
feasible Formally
i  Ns  X  u
i
s 

r
i
s
m
i
if m
i
  or if m
i
  and p
i
 F s
r
i
s if m
i
  and p
i
 F s
Recall that a strategy prole s  X of a game hN X
i

iN
 u
i

iN
i is a strong Nash
equilibrium if there is no coalition of players that can protably deviate from s ie if
there is no coalition S  	
N
n f	g and a strategy combination s  X with s
i
 s
i
for
all i  N n S such that u
i
s  u
i
s for each i  S with strict inequality for at least
one player i  S Denote the collection of strong Nash equilibria of a strategic game
G  hN X
i

iN
 u
i

iN
i by SNEG Core elements of the cooperative shortest path
game exactly coincide with payos to strong Nash equilibria in the strategic shortest path
game
Theorem 
 Let hN A
i

iN
 w r
i

iN
i be a shortest path problem N v the associ
ated cooperative game and G  hN X
i

iN
 u
i

iN
i the associated strategic game Then
CN v  fu
i
s
iN
j s  SNEGg
Proof To prove that CN v  fu
i
s
iN
j s  SNEGg let x  CN v Let
p be a shortest path owned by the grand coalition N  Dene the strategy combination
s  p
i
m
i

iN
 X by setting
i  N  p
i
 p and m
i
 r
i

 x
i

By Proposition 	 only sveto players can have x
i
 r
i
and consequently m
i
  Since
sveto players indeed own arcs on the shortest path p the strategy combination s is
welldened only players owning arcs on p can make claims Clearly F s  fpg and

	
ui
s  r
i

m
i
 x
i
for each i  N  To show that s  SNEG suppose to the contrary
that coalition S  	
N
n f	g can protably deviate to strategies p
i
m
i

iS
 Call the new
strategy prole s
i  N  s
i


p
i
m
i
 if i  N n S
p
i
m
i
 if i  S
Since s involves a protable deviation of coalition S
i  S  u
i
s  u
i
s 
i  S  u
i
s  u
i
s 
Suppose F s  	 ie there are no feasible paths in the strategy combination s Then
u
i
s    x
i
 u
i
s for each i  S contradicting  Therefore
F s  	 
Assume in the remainder of the proof that the members of S all choose a feasible path
i  S  p
i
 F s 

This involves no loss of generality if S can protably deviate at all then S can in
particular protably deviate to a strategy combination satisfying 
 since players i  S
for which p
i
 F s can deviate from s by choosing
e
p
i
 F s which is possible by 
and
f
m
i
  without decreasing the payos of the members of S Results  and 

imply that u
i
s  r
i

m
i
for each i  S possibly with m
i
  With  and 
i  S  u
i
s  r
i

m
i
 u
i
s  r
i

m
i
 


i  S  u
i
s  r
i

m
i
 u
i
s  r
i

m
i
 
	
Summing over i  S we nd that
X
iS
m
i

X
iS
m
i
 

The collection R  fp
i
j i  Sg of paths selected by the members of S in strategy
combination s is a nonempty nite set By 

R  F s 

To derive a contradiction from our initial assumption that S can protably deviate from
s to s we discern two cases
 Suppose that the shortest path p used to dene the initial strategy combination s
is chosen by a member of S after deviation to s p  R This means that in the
strategy combination s every player i  N in the strategy combination s chooses a
path in the set R members of S do so by denition and players in N n S choose
the path p  R By 
 all paths in R are indeed paid for by the players in N 
X
iS
m
i

X
iNnS
m
i

X
qR
costq  costp  cN 
X
iN
m
i

This implies
P
iS
m
i

P
iS
m
i
 contradicting 



 Suppose p  R ie p
i
 p for each i  S This means that in the strategy
combination s all players in S choose a path from the set R and all players in N nS
choose the path p  R By 
 all paths in R are indeed paid for by the players
in S
X
iS
m
i

X
qR
costq  cS 

where the second inequality follows from the fact that all paths in R  F s are
owned by the members of S and therefore cost at least as much as the shortest path
owned by coalition S Since u
i
s
iN
 x  CN v we also have using 

 and

	 that
rS 

X
iS
m
i

X
iS
u
i
s 
X
iS
u
i
s  vS  rS
 cS
from which we conclude
P
iS
m
i
 cS contradicting 

Since both cases yield a contradiction it must be that s  SNEG as was to be shown
To prove that CN v  fu
i
s
iN
j s  SNEGg let s  p
i
m
i

iN
 SNEG
Each player i  N with p
i
 F s can avoid a negative payo by making a zero contribu
tion or a negative contribution if he owns arcs on his selected path p
i
 Therefore
i  N  u
i
s   

i  N  if p
i
 F s then m
i
  and u
i
s  r
i
s 

If F s  	 then 
 implies that u
i
s   for all i  N  But then s is not a strong
Nash equilibrium since the previous part of the proof indicates that the grand coalition N
can deviate to a strategy combination yielding a payo x  CN v This is a protable
deviation since individual rationality implies that x
i
 vfig   for each i  N and by
eciency
P
iN
x
i
 vN   where the inequality follows from assumption 
 so at
least one player i  N obtains a strictly positive payo As a consequence F s  	
In fact F s must be a singleton set Suppose to the contrary that F s consists of
at least two elements Let p  F s and S  fi  N j p
i
 p and m
i
 g Coalition S
is nonempty since p  F s implies that
P
iN p
i
p
m
i
 costp   Each player i  S
receives payo u
i
s  r
i

m
i
 However deviating to p
i
m
i

iS
with p
i
 p and m
i
 
would yield a set of feasible paths F s n fpg which is nonempty by our assumption that
F s contains at least two elements Hence each member i  S after deviating receives
a payo r
i
 r
i

 m
i
 u
i
s which is an improvement contradicting s  SNEG
Therefore there exists a unique path p such that
F s  fpg 

Combining 
 and 
 yields
i  N  u
i
s 

r
i

m
i
if p
i
 p
r
i
if p
i
 p




The path p has to be a shortest path Suppose to the contrary that p is not a shortest
path Select a shortest path q Since F s  fpg
X
iN p
i
p
m
i

X
iN p
i
p and m
i
	
m
i

X
iN p
i
p and m
i
	
m
i
 costp  costq
This implies the existence of a 	   
 such that
X
iN p
i
p and m
i
	
m
i

X
iN p
i
p and m
i
	
	m
i
 costq 	
Let coalition S  fi  N j p
i
 pg deviate to p
i
m
i

iS
with
i  S  p
i
 q and m
i


m
i
if m
i
 
	m
i
if m
i
 
Let s denote the strategy combination after this deviation of coalition S By 	 F s 
fqg Consequently
i  S  u
i
s 

r
i

m
i
 u
i
s if m
i
 
r
i

 	m
i
 r
i

m
i
 u
i
s if m
i
 
This is a protable deviation by coalition S contradicting s  SNEG Conclude that
p in 
 is indeed a shortest path
From 
 it follows that
P
iN p
i
p
m
i
 costp Analogous to the proof in the
previous paragraph that p is a shortest path one can show that the weak inequality must
be an equality
X
iN p
i
p
m
i
 costp  cN 	

Otherwise a protable deviation exists by letting the contributors fi  N j p
i

p and m
i
 g pay slightly less but sucient to cover the costs of the shortest path
p Combining 
 and 	
 yields
X
iN
u
i
s 
X
iN p
i
p
r
i

m
i
 
X
iN p
i
p
r
i
 rN 

X
iN p
i
p
m
i
 rN
 cN  vN
To show that u
i
s
iN
 CN v it remains to show that
P
iS
u
i
s  vS for each
coalition S  	
N
n f	 Ng Suppose to the contrary that
P
iS
u
i
s  vS for coalition
S  	
N
n f	 Ng By 
 vS  rS
 cS   By 

X
iS
u
i
s  rS

X
iSp
i
p
m
i
 vS  rS
 cS
which implies that the net contribution
P
iSp
i
p
m
i
of players in W  fi  S  p
i
 pg
exceeds cS  
X
iSp
i
p
m
i
 cS 		
Therefore W  	 Discern two cases


 if cS  cN then S owns a path q  p with costq  cS
 if cS  cN then
P
iSp
i
p
m
i
 cN by 		 Combining this with 	
 yields
P
iNnSp
i
p
m
i
  Consequently m
i
  for some player i  N n S with p
i
 p
By denition of a strategy this player i  N n S owns at least one arc on the path
p otherwise he is not allowed to make negative contributions This implies that S
does not own all arcs on the path p But cS  cN implies that a path q  p
exists that is owned by S and satises costq  cS
In both cases S owns a path q  p with costq  cS By 		 there exists a 	   

such that
X
iSp
i
p and m
i
	
m
i

X
iSp
i
p and m
i
	
	m
i
 cS  costq 	
Let S deviate to strategies p
i
m
i

iS
with
i  S  p  q and m
i





	
 if p
i
 p
m
i
if p
i
 p and m
i
 
	m
i
if p
i
 p and m
i
 
Let s denote the strategy combination after this deviation of coalition S By 	 q 
F s Consequently
i  S  u
i
s 




	
r
i
 u
i
s if p
i
 p
r
i

m
i
 u
i
s if p
i
 p and m
i
 
r
i

 	m
i
 r
i

m
i
 u
i
s if p
i
 p and m
i
 
This is a protable deviation by coalition S contradicting s  SNEG Conclude that
indeed
P
iS
u
i
s  vS for each S  	
N
n f	 Ng as was to be shown 
Remark 
 In the strategic shortest path game a player receives his reward if the set
of feasible paths is nonempty irrespective of whether he chooses a feasible path as part
of his strategy An obvious modication of the strategic game would be to give a player
his reward only if he chooses a feasible path One can modify the proof to show that also
in that case the conclusion of Theorem 
 holds
An additional modication would be to assign payo zero to players selecting a nonfea
sible path players that contribute to a nonfeasible path are paid back their contribution
whereas players making claims on an infeasible path are denied their claim The resulting
payo functions u
i

iN
would be dened as follows
i  Ns  X  u
i
s 

r
i

m
i
if p
i
 F s
 if p
i
 F s
Also under this modication Theorem 
 remains valid
Both alternative denitions of the payo functions require only minor changes in the
proof of Theorem 
 The proof however would become longer without giving more
insight We therefore did not adopt these alternative denitions 


By denition of a strategy players are allowed to make claims only on those paths on
which they own arcs If players would have been allowed to make claims on paths where
they own no arcs the conclusion of Theorem 
 is no longer valid Consider for instance
the shortest path problem in which N  f
 	g r

 r

  and the network is given
in Figure 	 Suppose we also allow player 	 to make claims on the unique path If both

So Si



Figure 	 Core and strong Nash equilibria
players select the shortest path player 
 contributes 	 and player 	 contributes 

 then
the path is feasible and the players have payos 
 	  
 and 
 

   respectively
It is easy to see that this is a strong Nash equilibrium but since the nonsveto player 	
receives a payo     r

 Proposition 	 implies that the payo vector 
  is not a
core allocation
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